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Abstract 
 This article theorizes the relationship of privacy to capital and projects 
of security and, in doing so, situates privacy in context to pacification. In 
particular, the article provides an interrogation of the contradictory structuring 
of privacy as both an object threatened by security and the role of privacy as a 
means to resist or limit projects of security. Through an analysis of Thomas 
Hobbes’ writings, this contradictory dual-deployment of privacy is unseated to 
reveal that far from challenging security, privacy has historically been 
presupposed and structured by security projects. Moreover, by acclimatizing us 
to our existence as atomized individuals, alienated from our collective social 
power, privacy in fact pacifies us. This process is explored through an 
examination of the Passenger Flight List agreement (PNR) between the United 
States and EU member states.  The article concludes with a brief discussion of 
the implications of our reliance on privacy has for challenging the logics of 
security and pacification, especially with the emergent technology of Drones.  
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 There is a conviction today that privacy is in a state of irretrievable crisis. In 
addition to the collection and sale of day-to-day personal activity by telecommunications 
services and social networking sites, programmes of surveillance and registration have 
allegedly eroded what were previously understood as the firm borders between public and 
private spheres of relations. That this has happened or is in the process of materializing                                                         
1  Aaron Henry is a PhD candidate at Carleton University reading Sociology and Political Economy.  
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has taken on the weight and opacity of a social fact. Yet, while privacy is said to be in a 
state of crisis, the ‘right to privacy’ is often trumpeted by liberals as the counterweight to 
balance the intrusion of state projects into the lives of individuals. Indeed, this appears to 
be the general sentiment that rests behind initiatives like the ‘Orwell Award’ given to 
companies that have violated privacy, or the American Civil Liberties Union recent 
mobilization against Drones as a privacy concern. Thus, privacy is presented as means to 
make intrusions into the life of the individual proportional to the objectives of security 
projects, and in some instances security projects are legitimized for the forms of privacy 
they safeguard (Cavoukian, 1999, 13). To this end, privacy is subject to a rather peculiar 
positioning as both a relation threatened by security and as a regulative principle capable 
of ensuring the ‘acceptable’ limits of security projects.  
What I want to demonstrate in this paper is that the relation of privacy to security as 
both an object threatened by security and as a means of regulating security projects is the 
product of a longstanding relation between privacy, security and capital. This relation is 
expressed in two ways. First, while privacy has been invoked as a means to resist projects 
of security, I argue that privacy is in fact deployed as a means to structure the fields of 
relations through which security interventions are made.2 In this sense, when the power 
of state or capital intervenes upon the individual, privacy emerges as a concept. Privacy, a 
retroactive concept, exists as a means to assuage individuals that the duration and scope 
of security projects will be ‘reasonable or proportional’; thus, security presupposes and 
delimits privacy. Second, in the course of defending the individual's freedom and 
autonomy over their inner world, privacy reinforces private property and private life, the 
very relations projects of security safeguard.  Thus, privacy acclimatizes us to a mode of 
existence where we are alienated from our collective social power, and so we confront 
relations of domination and exploitation as private individuals. This commodification of 
our selves is, I suggest, part of the condition of pacification. 
First, I attempt to theorize how security and its relation to capital render it not only 
generative of privacy but structure its perimeters. I demonstrate the formation of this 
relationship between security and privacy through a critical reading of Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. Second, I offer a contemporary example of this relation between privacy and 
security through an analysis of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement between 
the United States and the EU. Finally, I conclude by reviewing how privacy as desirable 
form of existence constitutes a form of pacification insofar as it not only fails to challenge 
capital but has further entrenched the logics of security into social life. 
 
 
                                                         
2 In this sense, I am taking a different stance from scholars like Steve Nock, who have argued that demands 
for privacy have engendered more complex and extensive projects of surveillance (see Nock 1993).  
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Capital, Security, Privacy 
 
 The relation between capital and the formation of the private sphere/privacy is 
hardly a novel study. In the Grundrisse, Marx lays out the relationship between the 
different historical formations of property-relations and corresponding forms of political 
association to demonstrate that it is with the advent of private-property that the totality of 
social life is split into the duality of private and public selves (Marx, 1973, 486; Marx, 
1975, 222; see Neocleous, 2002,). In many respects, Jurgen Habermas’ seminal work The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere reworks Marx’s insight. Habermas locates 
the formation of private life and, therein, the bourgeois public sphere in the “social 
precondition…[of] a market that, tending to be liberalized made the affairs in the sphere 
of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people” (1991, 74). To this 
end, the duality of private and public life is the product of a capitalist market with a form 
of state authority that exists to guarantee this private life with the liberal political virtue of 
“freedom”: freedom of movement, of trade, and of conscience. While Habermas’s study 
effectively links capitalist development to the formation of private life, the relation of 
private life to security projects remains underdeveloped. In fact, taking private life as the 
space where liberal freedoms are articulated autonomously through the ‘free space’ of 
civil society ignores the logics of security in capitalist society. Thus, it can be argued that 
adopting Habermas’ view leaves us vulnerable to falling back on the contradictory 
position of privacy as a relation that is both threatened by and regulative of, security.  We 
can perhaps move past this contradictory perception of privacy by trying to think 
through privacy in relation to security and capitalist production.  
 What is, then, the relation of security to capital? No doubt any answer to this 
question will be partial. Nevertheless it is useful to open this question by noting that Marx 
declared “security the supreme social concept of civil society; the concept of police” 
(1975, 43). To this end, Marx’s reasoning behind this appears to be that the concept of 
security not only ensures egoism but that the only “bond between men is natural 
necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property” (1975, 43). If we 
take a liberal perspective, the matter is settled: security exists to guarantee the supremacy 
of the individual in their private life so that they may in turn pursue their own private 
interests; thus, security does not serve capital but private individuals who express 
themselves in what happens to be capitalist society (see Von Mises 1962, 68). But, to take 
this position is to overlook Marx’s further insight that private life in capitalist society is 
nothing more than an abstraction (Marx, 1978, 22).  Private-life, its mode of articulation 
and form of existence is nothing more than abstract reflection of real relations between 
private-property. Thus, security ensures the liberty to buy and sell labour, the freedom of 
mobility, freedom of conscience. More broadly put, it ensures the “separation of man 
from man” and does so in the course of solidifying and entrenching the social relations 
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that stand behind these freedoms: the relations of private property (Marx, 1978, 46). Not 
only has this point been well established (see Rigakos, and Hadden 2001; Rigakos 2011; 
Neocleous 2007) but, further still, as the guarantee of private property first and the 
freedom of the liberal subject second, security perpetually determines and conditions 
liberty (Neocleous, 2007)3. 
 Thus security pertains not to the freedoms of the individual as they actually exist 
actively but in terms of the abstract universal freedoms that are determined by the 
formation of private-property relations. This point is effectively borne out in the 
understanding of police in eighteenth century thought. Adam Smith is quite clear that 
police, as having jurisprudence over public-security, must be deployed as a means to 
safeguard not only the industry of people but also the conditions of industry itself. In 
particular, security is necessary to protect “the industry of individuals from the rapacity of 
their neighbours” as individuals who “find themselves every moment in danger of being 
robbed of all they posses [have] not motive to be industrious” (2009, [1763, 157). 
Moreover, security should be utilized to establish commerce and manufacturing, as the 
independence these [activities] provide is the “best police in preventing crimes” (2009, 
[1763], 152). In short, security or police for Smith are not rooted so much in safeguarding 
the individual but in safeguarding industry and commerce themselves; in other words, 
maintaining above all else the social relations of private property as these social relations 
produce opulence and thus order. Patrick Colquhoun is even less abashed about the 
relation of security to capital as he simply states in his Treatise on the Police of the 
Metropolis that the function of police as the “prevention and detection of crimes” but the 
“internal regulations for the well ordering and comfort of civil society” (Colquhoun, 1800 
[1795], 244); thus, as others have noted, this well-ordering and comfort of civil society 
pertain above all else to the continuity of capitalist social relations (Rigakos 2011; 
Neocleous 2000). All this has been established. What remains elusive here though is how 
this relation between security and capital relates to private life. In this sense, why is it that 
far from confronting security, private life and privacy are in fact generated within 
security? The writings of Hobbes are useful in sketching out the emergence of this 
conditioning relation between security and privacy.  
 Much of Leviathan is devoted to the ‘Mortal Sovereign’ as a necessary form of 
political covenant. The necessity of the covenant, arguably, stems from three positions. 
Foremost, each individual, by the law of nature, has the liberty “to use his own as he will 
himself for the preservation of this nature; that is to say, of his own life” and, 
consequently, “has a right to every thing; even to one another’s body” (Hobbes, 1968, 
[1651], 189-190). Second, while each individual is not only by nature free to use their own                                                         
3 The literature on alienation and its various social forms in capitalist society has a vast literature, see for 
instance, B. Ollman’s classic 1971 work: “Alienation: Marx’s conception of man in capitalist society” or 
István Mészáros, 1970, “Marx’s Theory of Alienation”.  
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powers as they see fit, nature itself has accorded each individual with the same, or roughly 
the same, material powers and needs (Macpherson, 1973, 226). Third, and perhaps more 
importantly, in the course of having equal powers and equal rights to use these powers 
each individual seeks out society so they “may receive some honour or profit from it” 
and, moreover that each will come into frequent and potentially violence conflict as they 
“[have] the appetite to the same thing”. Taken together, each individual has a right to 
anything and relatively equal powers to obtain it; and thus, everyone has a claim to 
everything. For “if there be no power erected or not great enough for our security; every 
man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other 
men” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 223); thus, each individual’s right to life, liberty, and profit, 
amount to nothing (Macpherson, 1973, 227). The only solution is the formation of “a 
common power to keep [all] in awe and to direct [the action of all] to a common benefit” 
(Hobbes, 1968,  [1651], 227).  In short, a supreme common power provides the essential 
security to defend the population against foreign attack and injuries from one another, so 
that “by their own industrie and by the fruite of the earth” each individual “may be able 
nourish themselves and live contentedly” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 227). In the course of 
asserting the Mortal Sovereign, Hobbes goes on to make a series of distinctions between 
liberty, security and publique and private domains.  
 Chapter XXII of Leviathan is entitled “Of Systems Subject, Politicall, and Private”. 
By systems, Hobbes informs us he means, “any number of men joined in one interest or 
business”. Of these some are absolute and independent (i.e. the Commonwealth) and 
others are dependent, to the Commonwealth as a person or group persons operating as 
‘representative’ subjects (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 274; for a discussion Hobbes and authors 
and actors see Neocleous, 2003, 73).  Yet subordinate to these systems are further systems, 
some “politicall and some private” (Ibid, 274). Private, according to Hobbes, are those 
“constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authorities from a stranger” as no 
authority from a foreign power in the dominion of another sovereign can be but ‘private’ 
(ibid, 275).  “Of these private systems some are lawful; some unlawful: lawfull are those 
which are allowed by the commonwealth” (Ibid, 275).  Most of these private systems are 
irregular.  They have no representative (that is, no embodiment of state) and “consist only 
in the concourse of people…such as the conflux of people to markets or shews or any 
other harmless end” (ibid, 275).  However, if the intention of these irregular private 
systems “are evil or (if the number [involved is] considerable) unknown, they are 
unlawful” (ibid, 275).  
 Hobbes’ attempt to partition forms of activity into the categories of ‘politicall’ and 
‘private’ is noteworthy for several reasons. First, as other scholars have noted, the ‘private’ 
as a sphere of activity remained for much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
indistinct from the state of being secret (see Abizadeh, 2013, Neocleous, 2002; Sennett, 
1974). In this sense, rather than positing private as a state of being concealed, hidden or 
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solidary from others (the terms that had been applied to both privacy and secrecy)4 
Hobbes links the act of being in private to a certain form of association other than that of 
forms of association posited by the commonwealth. Thus, private life and privacy is 
foregrounded in Hobbes not as a condition of visibility or boundaries of the home – 
which is for Hobbes the state of secrecy5 –  but in terms of whether the interest of the 
individuals involved are ‘apart’ or separate from organizations and associations that are 
representations or subordinate elements of the sovereign. What makes this distinction all 
the more intriguing is that Hobbes arrives at it after outlining the relation of ‘particular’ 
(that is, ‘private’) liberty and the security and liberty of the sovereign.  
 It is the role of the sovereign to provide security and public defense to all subjects. 
As such, the subject’s liberty exists only in activities and relations that “the sovereign hath 
permitted” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 264). To this end, Hobbes is quite explicit about the 
forms of activity that are permitted: “the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise contract 
with one another, to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life and 
institute their children as they themselves think fit and the like” (Hobbes, 1968, 264). This 
liberty, though, is permitted precisely because the liberty (liberty defined by Hobbes as 
the absence of “external opposition”) does not abolish or limit “the sovereign power of 
life and death” (Hobbes, 1968, 264). Rather, the existence of this form of liberty of 
‘particular men’, the freedom to engage in a private trade or calling, is the product of the 
security provided by the sovereign, the guarantee of the publique sword and its role in the 
defense of private men (Hobbes, 1968 386). Furthermore, that there exists inheritance, 
the propriety of goods or land for private individuals, is not the product of private liberty 
particular to each man but is, rather a product of the limitation of this liberty by the 
sovereign’s provision of security (Hobbes, 1968 266). There are a few points I want to 
draw from here.    
 First, at a cursory glance here it may seem as if I have declared nothing more than 
that security trumps and presupposes liberty; a feature of capitalist society that Mark 
Neocleous (2007) has already argued persuasively. However, if Hobbes lays this relation 
of security to liberty bare, his writings also reveal that it is from this relation that private 
life itself becomes inscribed as its own distinct sphere of activity. Thus, private life as a 
sphere of activities that the individual may regulate ‘as they see fit’ emerges not in 
opposition to security or sovereign force but, rather, as the product of security. Hobbes 
demonstrates that it remains the sovereign’s prerogative to intervene upon and prohibit 
certain activities that make up this private association. In particular, private interests are                                                         
4 See, Arash Abizadeh 2013 for a discussion on theologists and Calvinists William Perkins and William 
Strutcher and their use of the words secret and private. 
 
5 In discussing forms of Worship Hobbes suggests that the first type is “secret” but the second is private and 
carried out “in the sight of the multitude” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 401).   
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lawful when they are productive and innocuous, but those which harbour evil intents or 
are simply unknown in motivation are unpermitted and subject to regulation. To this 
end, private life is presented as being presupposed by security but also and at the same 
time a perpetual object of surveillance and regulation. Thus, one has the contradictory 
positioning of private life as the guarantee of the sovereign’s security, the point where 
regulation ends, and private life as a continuum of endless risk to this very security. 
Taken from the standpoint of private life, privacy appears both as the limitation to 
security and as the point where this autonomous private life is comprised by sovereign 
power.  
 Second, if this is perhaps the relation of privacy to security, what, then, does 
Hobbes’ work tell us about the initial relation between capital, security and privacy? To 
answer this question in full and with certainty would be remiss given that the milieu 
Hobbes is writing in is that of early capitalist society, the coming rather than 
consolidation of bourgeois rule (Macpherson, 1973, 247). Nonetheless, what we can say is 
that Hobbes’s description of human nature as acquisitive and selfish and his imposition 
of the sovereign as a supreme power presupposes the sphere of accumulation. The 
Commonwealth is charged with a number of tasks: defense, public worship, security, 
courts and procreation, but in many respects, much of its purpose is to control what are 
the innate drives and mechanical processes of human beings.  The ‘control’ of these 
drives, though, cannot be achieved by stamping them out or blunting them, for they are 
natural or innate. Hence the task is to atomize each individual’s mechanical drive, to 
instill fear into ‘all’ so that in the pursuit of profit, glory or status one does not deprive 
someone else of their own life or property; the sovereign thereby ensures “the absence of 
opposition” not between the commonwealth and the individual but rather between 
individuals. In this sense, Hobbes' sovereign produces isolated men and women 
indifferent to each other as they pursue their own objects, and so ensures the conditions 
for the sine qua non social bond for capitalist society: “reciprocal independence and 
indifference” (Marx, 1973, 161). The establishment of market society, the pursuit of profit 
and accumulation without direct violence, thus requires not only the emergence of 
security but also the emergence of private life as a mode of mediating the interests of so-
called acquisitive individuals.  
 Last, but related to these first two points, the state of being private, as Hobbes 
outlines it, is also a means of pacifying individuals to the logics of security. Not only does 
private life keep individuals apart and disinterested, it also restricts their capacity for 
rebellion. In particular, Hobbes is quite clear that what is needed to maintain political 
rule is a ‘common’ supreme power, to overwhelm individuals into ‘obedience’. The power 
of the sovereign to dictate the rights of life and death leaves individuals too fearful to 
rebel, but at the same time the very structure and limitations of private life equally 
restricts the private individual’s ability to act in political concert. Private life as a state of 
existence with neither ‘representation’ nor the right to ‘act’ on the behalf of the 
100
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 9 (2) Winter 2013   
commonwealth, denies individuals the capacity to form political rule. In fact, Hobbes is 
explicit on the point: it is when individuals gather in private in large numbers for 
unknown ends or ends that are contrary to the commonwealth that private life must be 
regulated or suspended. Thus private life, as envisioned by Hobbes, is its own form of 
pacification. Not only are individuals subjected to market relations but their very form of 
personal liberty and autonomy is premised on their restriction from forms of political 
representation or action that challenge sovereign power. The continuity and the effects of 
this relation between privacy and security can be demonstrated through an examination 
of the recent agreement on Passenger Name Records (PNR) between the United States 
and the European Union.  
 
Security and the Perimeters of Privacy: The Passenger Carry Code Agreement 
 
 In 2011 the European Union and the United States ratified The Passenger Carry 
Code Agreement (PCC). The legislation pertained to the “use and transfer of Passenger 
Name Records (PNR) to the United States Department of Homeland Security”.7 The 
document is four chapters in length and outlines the forms of information that airline 
carries are required to pass along to the EU and the United States government, and the 
techniques that will be used to protect the privacy of all individuals subject to this 
legislation. The ratification of the act requires all airlines to implement systems capable of 
gathering PNRs on nineteen forms of passenger information ranging from the name of 
the passenger, date of reservation/issue of ticket, personal information such as date of 
birth, address, gender and in some instances occupation.8  I will, briefly, review the 
specifics of the PCC Agreement.  
The preamble of the document reads as follows: 
 
RECOGNIZING, right and responsibility of states to ensure the security of 
their citizens and protect their borders and mindful of the responsibility of 
all nations to protect the life and safety of the public including those using                                                         
7 The United States had sought such an agreement with a number of countries. A similar arrangement with 
Canada was ratified in March 2012 with amendments to the Aeronautics Act to by Bill-C42.  The Act allows 
passenger flight information to be sent to the USA and for Canadians to be subject to the restrictions of US 
no fly lists even if aboard a flight that only enters US airspace on route to another destination. 
8 Full list is as follows: PNR record locator code, date of reservation/issue of ticket, date(s) of intended 
travel, name (s) on PNR including all available contact information (this includes home addresses if 
available through the mode of books), all available payment/billing information, travel itinerary for specific 
PNR, Travel agency/travel agent, code share information, split/divided information, travel status of 
passenger (including confirmations and check-in status) ticketing information, baggage information, seat 
information including seat number, general remarks (including special service remarks and special service 
request (SSR) and information from the advance passenger information system, all historical changes to the 
PNR listed under points 1-18.  
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international transport systems…and that information sharing is an 
essential component in the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime and that in this context, the processing an use of 
passenger name records (PRN) is a necessary tool that gives information 
that cannot be obtained by other means. 
 
Mindful of the EU's commitments pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union on respect for fundamental rights, the right to privacy 
with regard to the processing of personal data as stipulated in Article 16 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of 
proportionality and necessity concerning the right to private and family 
life, the respect for privacy, and the protection of personal data. 
 
      The document then goes on to outline the actual mechanisms in place to facilitate 
the collection, transfer and sharing of these records. In particular, to ensure the accuracy, 
security and integrity of the information obtained through PNRs and “to respect the 
privacy of individuals”, PNR data is subject to both sorting and storage procedures (PNR, 
2011, 11). All PNR files are to be encrypted, stored in databases secured by “physical 
intrusion controls” and accessed only by listed authorized individuals. The use of the files 
will be documented and logged by the Department of Homeland Security. Furthermore 
in the actual collection of the passenger information of individuals all ‘sensitive data’ such 
“as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade 
union membership, or health/ sex” of the individual will be filtered through automated 
systems that will censor such information from the DHS (PNR, 2011, 15). In this sense 
the life of the individual will be filtered through automated systems that will censor such 
information from the DHS.  
      This sensitive data will be deleted not later than thirty days after it has been 
received but in the case of security issues can be retained as required by law enforcement 
agencies. To this end, while sensitive data should be masked from DHS officials, such 
sensitive data can be made available to the DHS (PNR, 2011, 15). Furthermore, non-
sensitive data can be stored for up to five years and after six months it is to 
depersonalized by the removal of names, other names on PNR, all available contact 
information, general remarks and advanced passenger information.  Following this active 
period the document calls for all PNR depersonalized data to be moved to a dormant 
database for no longer than ten years. The PNR information held on the database can be 
‘repersonalized’ and activated for the purposes of law enforcement operations with 
identifiable case, threat or risk.  
  The document concludes by outlining both the safeguards put in place to protect 
the individual’s privacy and a rather meager account of the modes of redress available to 
individuals who believe their privacy has been violated. These include: the individual’s 
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right to request copies of the information held about them; to challenge the DHS if they 
have been “delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because they were 
wrongly identified as a threat” (PNR, 2011, 21); the right of the individual to have their 
record withheld from the public; individuals will not face any form of unlawful 
discrimination in the collection and utilization of their PNR; and, finally, that the 
individual’s request for PNR information is circumscribed by the United States law which 
may limit the individual’s request if such a request conflicts with the necessity to 
“safeguard privacy-protected, national security, and law enforcement sensitive 
information” (PNR, 2011, 19). There are three key points that can be made developed 
here.  
 First, the PNR agreement reveals that privacy is subservient to the objectives of 
securing national borders and populations. In this sense, within this document privacy by 
no means confronts security, challenges it or sets its limits. Rather, those who drafted the 
agreement have decreed that privacy begins merely where the project of security ceases; 
thus, what information is excluded, who will access this information, what details are 
considered sensitive and non-sensitive and the duration of records form the guarantee of 
privacy. Far from privacy circumscribing security, it is security that circumscribes 
privacy. Security decrees the activities and relations that can be declared to form the 
individual’s privacy.  
 Second, it is noteworthy how privacy is constructed and verified within the PNR 
system. In particular, there is in the document a distinction between the anonymous, 
non-sensitive depersonalized subject of security and that of the visible individual 
attributed by trade union membership, religious beliefs and political opinions, sex life and 
health whose privacy must be ‘ensured’. In particular, the agreement reveals a conscious 
balancing between information that is constituted and arranged in such a way to form the 
abstract object of security projects and information that is constitutive of personhood 
and, therein, accorded privacy. In this sense, this partitioning has arguably directed the 
politics of the PNR agreement away from the definite security practices of monitoring 
and recording individuals, their movements, their families, travel plans, available contact 
details (addresses), their political affiliations, to whether or not said individual can be 
personally identified by authorities who have access to elements of this information. I do 
not believe this represents so much a retrenchment of security by privacy but rather the 
expression of a longstanding tendency in the relations between security and liberalism.  
 If the project of liberalism, as Michel Foucault has claimed, is at once the 
deployment of apparatuses of security, apparatuses that prefigure liberty and 
simultaneously in their course of operation ‘let things happen’, this scheme encounters 
the private individual of capitalist society in a rather contradictory manner (Foucault, 
2007, 48). In particular, as mentioned earlier, projects of security are deployed to ensure 
that civil society, the sphere of the ‘egoistic individual’, remains functional and orderly. 
Thus the task of security is largely to ensure that market relations are maintained and that 
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the relations to production are not disrupted or destroyed. The difficulty that arises here, 
however, is that much of what ensures that these economic relations retain their order is 
the individual’s freedom to engage in the buying and selling of labour, consumption and 
commerce. Thus, one has a contradictory stance as the private subject’s activity and 
proclivities must be ‘let to happen’ and unfold and, at the same-time, the same individual 
must be policed and monitored to ensure the security of the very economic relations that 
structure their very appearance as private individuals. Thus privacy and private life are 
infringed upon by projects of security while these same projects justify their operation 
through the promotion of the private sphere as a site where the individual remains 
unfettered and unobstructed in their realization of the liberty of market exchange 
(Neocleous, 2002, 103). It is arguable that the PNR agreement circumvents this 
contradiction by rendering abstract life, the anonymous objective features of the social 
body as permanent objects of registration while positing the real definite lives of the 
individuals who make up of this social body and, therein, the ‘material of registration and 
surveillance, as that which has the ‘right’ to exist beyond the remit of projects of security.  
 Third, the use of privacy in this document arguably serves to sublimate what are 
direct and repressive relations of rule and coercion into a set of contractual terms. In 
particular, in practice PNR is used to restrict the mobility of some individuals, to cross-
check (excuse the pun) and add individuals on the DHS ‘no fly’ list and to track 
individuals in the hopes of preempting them from compromising national and public 
security, be this settling in a country ‘illegally’ or smuggling cocaine. It would be remiss 
not to state, that there is of course nothing ‘random’ about which individuals are targeted 
by PNR. Rather, PNR is a racialized and gendered processes: it is, for instance, far more 
likely that Muslim men will be subject to PNR targeting rather than white 
American/European women. However, whether one wishes to participate in this system 
of relations, let alone challenge it, is non-negotiable.   
 Yet the inclusion of privacy as an obstacle that security must respect and 
acknowledge, offers the illusion of personal control. The absence of choice in being 
recorded, monitored, split into multiple identities stored in separate databases is made 
palatable by our ability to confront the system. We are given the right to receive our own 
records: to see ourselves as the authorities see us. If we are delayed or detained we may 
inquire as to why and, above all, we are assured that our right to privacy ensures that we 
will be stored in a manner that restores us to anonymity. All of these measures are not 
only retroactive but pre-determined by the limits of security to begin with: if we receive 
our own records it is only because they were already recorded; if we are returned to 
anonymity it is only because we were initially targeted and specified. Yet, further still, not 
only is privacy then fully inscribed into security, but the success of privacy, its very 
completion, offers nothing more than a return to the freedoms of private life, which is a 
return to the freedoms that conditioned and deployed the apparatuses of security in the 
first instance.  
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All of this should be enough to throw-out the concept of privacy or, at the very least, 
to cease to see security and privacy as counter-veiling forces. Yet I think there are further 
implications that the advancement of privacy as a right has on social life in capitalist 
society.  
 
Security, Privacy and Pacification 
 
    We have established the idea that ‘privacy’ has the effect of disassociating security 
from the fabrication of private life or, rather, privacy creates the conception that security 
is distinct and balanced by liberalism.  What does any of this have to do with privacy and 
the further alienation of our collective social power?  It is not enough to state that privacy 
is the means whereby security extends itself into social life and assures us of its own 
proportionality or reasonableness. Rather, privacy not only fails to challenge capital, as 
Neocleous has demonstrated (2002, 106) but, further still, lends itself to the reification of 
capitalist social relations and the further separation of the individual to their own social 
power and objective conditions of life. Privacy not only numbs us to the logics of security 
and its reasonable agreement to let certain areas of our lives occur seemingly 
unencumbered by security projects. Rather, it ensures, through the limits privacy sets on 
our experiences of collective life, the forms of political activity and social engagement that 
appear possible to us, that in advancing privacy we only further reinforce security and its 
colonization of “all aspects of human practices and thinking” (Rigakos, 2011, 62).  
  As Marx noted “labour is, therefore, the objectification of [human] species life,” 
reality is constructed through and mediates upon the social, economic, and biological 
conditions through which humans contemplate their own objectively constituted 
existence (Marx, 1975, 76). It follows that species being, as both the object and will of 
one’s practical activity and as the objective reality contained and represented in the 
products of labour, is estranged by the condition of labour in capitalist society. Thus, in 
the course of making the worker’s product nothing more than the “means to our physical 
existence” in equal measure species-life itself becomes [merely] a means” as well (Marx, 
1975, 77).  The estrangement of life and labour from nature and other people force both 
nature and other people to “appear as objects other than and differentiated from” [the 
labourer] (Marx, 1975, 78). As such, relations that one confronts independently of one’s 
own particular labour, forces of ‘nature’ and other individuals appear “as something alien 
and objective, confronting [individuals] not as their relations to one another but as our 
subordination to relations which exist independently of [us]” developing merely from the 
collisions between mutually indifferent individuals (Marx, 1973, 157). To this end, with 
the advent of capitalist relations, the individual’s understanding of themselves as part of a 
species life dissipates and instead the predominant social bond between individuals is that 
of “a spontaneous interconnection, [a] material and mental metabolism…independent of 
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the knowing and willing individuals [which] presupposes their “reciprocal independence 
and indifference” (Marx, 1973, 161). Consequently, as the contemplation of social life of 
life-activity as a shared social product wanes and in its place individuals increasingly find 
themselves “ruled by abstractions” as objective relations of dependency, the reciprocal 
relations of production appear separate and autonomous to the individuals who 
constitute these very relations (Marx, 1973, 164).  
 My point is not that ‘privacy’ produces these conditions; the estrangement of 
individuals from species-life is innate to capitalist production. My point is that privacy 
serves to further acclimatize us to this reification of species-life as nothing more than the 
atomized world of the ‘individual’. Which is a way of saying that privacy is part and 
parcel of the process of pacification, a key mechanism in the fabrication of bourgeois 
order. In particular, it is only in the absence of species-life, when our relations of our 
social dependence take on the fantastic form of relations between things and relations 
between people appear as forces alien to us, that the partitioning of social life into private 
isolated, ‘natural’ individuals becomes feasible; “liberty is… the right to do everything 
which does not harm others” it is essentially “the right of the circumscribed individual, 
withdrawn into him/herself” (Marx, 1975, 42). Thus, the demand for privacy is not 
merely forever circumscribed by the logics of security but it entrenches the very 
separations between people presupposed by capitalist social relations that security is used 
to enforce and maintain. Privacy, then, promises a life apart, a mode of existence separate 
from others and to this end is presupposed by our appearance as individuals who are 
autonomous from another and can, therefore, ‘choose’ to be further detached and apart. 
Before concluding I think there is an overarching political implication from this relation 
between privacy, security and capital. This appearance of choice, of course, serves only to 
further obfuscate the social nature of human existence and our inextricable tie to unequal 
class, gender and race relations.    
 By agreeing to live in the form of privacy that is carved out by security projects, we 
live as individuals who perceive their primary social bond with society to be nothing 
more than a spontaneous, indifferent and independent set of connections. Any social 
forces we are confronted by are, by definition, abstractions of the concrete real relations 
of society. As such, increasingly structural forces such as unemployment, ecological 
catastrophe, fears about old-age or even general depression or dissatisfaction have the 
appearance of existing completely suspended from our society and our mode of social (re) 
production. In this sense, adhering to privacy, as a mode of resistance does not just leave 
one apart from society but it ‘displaces’ the social with the ‘personal’. In this sense, it is 
only partially true, as Tocqueville claimed, “as the extent of political society expands, one 
must expect the sphere of private life to contract” (1968, [1840], 782-3). It may be true 
that as political society grows, it develops to include new apparatuses to consolidate and 
legitimate dominant relations of rule (Abrams, 1977, 58); but in capitalist society the 
growth of political society in any substantive sense (i.e. the common deliberation on life 
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in its totality not merely in its forms of abstraction) is utterly antithetical to conditions of 
accumulation in capitalist society; after-all, the egotistical person “is [in capitalist society] 
the foundation and presupposition of the political state” (Marx, 1975, 45). However, the 
opposite holds; as political society shrinks the larger the sphere of ‘private social life’ 
looms.  
 In particular, the less leave we are given collectively to contemplate and organize 
the objective conditions of social reproduction (education, labour, health-care, old-age) 
and the more private market relations come to dominate our social experience, the more 
private life becomes our only mode of contemplation and action. Indeed, although we 
should not conflate privacy and privatization, the latter historically presupposes the 
emergence of the former, privacy has increasingly become a force of further 
commodification. Not solely in terms of direct commodification but in eschewing one’s 
existence as a social being, individuals are increasingly left with no other expression or 
mode of contemplation outside their own private milieu. As such, when confronted by 
social, economic and political forces the recourse of the private individual is not to 
confront these forces as the products of our own objective activity or even as incidents 
that can be challenged collectively but as personal threats or risks. Thus, each, in the scale 
of their own atomized sense of reality, manages these personal risks and effects through 
the only sphere of relations open to the private individual: commodification and 
correlative security projects.  Thus, we purchase security against disease, security against 
disability, theft, unemployment, old age, etc. as these things crowd into our ‘lives apart 
from society’ as nothing more than personal concerns abstracted from the objective 
concrete relations that determine them. To the extent that human life becomes monadic 
and takes on the appearance of being assailed by alien forces, the more the demands for 
protection from these forces is expressed in purchases of private or individual security 
from these forces; which, in turn, only makes social life all the more atomized and ‘apart’. 
Thus, in the course of drawing on privacy as a means to confront economic and political 
domination,  we are not only acclimatized to the existence of these relations but we are 
pacified, or at least deterred, from radical, collective forms of political action.  
 “Security is not just hegemonic, it is hegemony”, says Rigakos (2011, 58). 
Attempts to reveal the tensions and points of incoherency within security projects simply 
seem to drive the greater refinement of these very projects. In many respects, it is the 
hegemony of security, its analytical inscrutability that has prompted the turn to 
pacification both as a concrete historical formation of rule and as an analytical concept, a 
means to reveal its contingencies, its overlaps, and points of formation (Rigakos, 2011, 61; 
Neocleous, 2010). The other problem posed by the hegemony of security, implicit to the 
first problem perhaps, is that in attaining hegemony it has colonized a number of social 
forms. This means that some relations that appear like sites of possible resistance, such as 
privacy, in fact form capillary points in the economy of relations behind security. With 
this problem in mind I have tried to tease out the historical relation of privacy to security 
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in capitalist society, so as to demonstrate how the former was, from the outset, entangled 
with the latter. Security presupposes privacy, decides its scope of power and the facets of 
social life to which it applies. Furthermore, not only does security condition privacy but 
also privacy itself, as a mode of life, has the effect of pacifying us to the further 
penetration of security into social life. Thus, privacy will be in existence for as long as the 
logics of security remain in play; for, as I outlined earlier in this discussion, it is the 
private sphere of relations, the sanctity of homo-economicus, that the project of police 
has long since had as its object. We on ‘the Left’ would do well to consider these aspects of 
privacy. As suggested by Tyler Wall’s paper in this collection, it is by making appeals to 
privacy, that drones in the United States have made the transition from battlefield 
technology to a component of the ‘domestic’ security apparatus. Following the insights 
from this paper, it can be argued that challenging drones through privacy will ostensibly 
experience moderate success. Drones perhaps will only be flown at certain times, in 
certain areas, and will contravene these rules only when vital security or safety concerns 
arise. The footage they capture will perhaps even be handled in a manner similar to the 
PNR data. Yet it is the security apparatus itself, not privacy, that will determine how these 
limits operate. These limits not only become our measure of freedom and autonomy but 
also structure our pacification. Thus, in a society that approaches security through the 
right to privacy, the proliferation of the conduct of war abroad and at home, the 
organization of human potential into a dehumanizing economic mode of production, will 
continue apace; insofar as these forces will continue to confront us as happenstance 
things, filtering in and out of each individual’s private, insular existence. To live this 
pacified mode of life is no less the promise of privacy than it is the guarantee of security.   
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